Recent experimental evidence suggests that noisy behavior correlates strongly with cognitive ability. This puts previous studies that found a negative relation between cognitive ability and risk aversion into perspective and in particular raises the question of how to achieve robust inference in this domain. This paper shows that using structural estimation that models heterogeneity of noise in combination with a balanced design allows us to mitigate the bias problem. Our estimations show that cognitive ability is related to noisy behavior rather than risk preferences. We also find age and education to be strongly related to noise, but the personality characteristics obtained using the Big Five inventory, are less related to noise and more robustly correlated to risk preferences.
2

Introduction
Making mistakes is human, but some people are more likely to err than others. Previous research has shown that error propensities are related to observable characteristics such as cognitive ability, education, age and gender (Andersson et al. 2016 , Choi et al. 2014 , von Gaudecker et al. 2011 , Burks et al. 2009 , Eckel 1999 . Since decision noise leads to bias in most elicitation tasks (see, for example, Crosetto and Filippin 2016) , there is a risk of falsely interpreting noise-driven relationships as preference driven. In Andersson et al. (2016) , we show that this danger is real by demonstrating that cognitive ability can be both positively and negatively correlated to estimated risk preferences, depending on how the risk elicitation task is constructed. This suggests that the relationship between cognitive ability and risk preferences reported in the earlier literature may be spurious (see, e.g., Benjamin et al. 2013 , Dohmen et al. 2010 ).
The previous evidence shows that decision errors are heterogeneous, which may lead to spurious inference regarding the relationship between risk preferences and personal characteristics. This problem should be taken seriously but it does not necessarily imply that any attempt to measure risk preferences and relating preferences to observable characteristics is futile.
Instead, the findings in this paper highlight that using appropriate elicitation tasks and econometric methods may help to overcome this bias. In regards econometric specifications, it is worth noticing that simple OLS estimations cannot handle such error structures. Instead, we need methods that take the heterogeneity of noise into account. A promising approach is to use "off the shelf" structural econometric specifications that take the heterogeneity of the noise into account in combination with multiple elicitation tasks so that the error structure can be estimated with precision.
In this paper, we demonstrate the usefulness of this approach. In particular, we estimate a random parameter CRRA utility function (Apesteguia and Ballester 2018) .
1 One appealing feature of structural models is that a range of parameters, including noise parameters, can be estimated jointly and be allowed to correlate with covariates. We estimate the models using experimental data from the iLEE panel, with subjects from all walks of life. 2 The dataset includes 1 Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) show convincingly that random utility models, such as the Luce models with random errors, are not monotone in risk preferences which may lead to an underestimation of the risk parameters. Their results generalize the insights established in Wilcox (2011) . 2 See http://www.econ.ku.dk/cee/ilee/ for a more detailed description of platform. 3 two Multiple Price Lists (MPLs) that differ with respect to the implied switch point for a given risk preference, and this difference allows for a precise estimation of the error structure.
We find that cognitive ability is significantly negatively related to risk aversion if we do not allow cognitive ability to correlate with the noise parameters, which corroborates previous findings (e.g., Benjamin et al. 2013 , Dohmen et al. 2010 . However, when we do allow for such correlation, we find no significant relation between risk aversion and cognitive ability. Instead, we observe that cognitive ability is negatively correlated to the amount of noise.
3 This analysis corroborates the findings of Andersson et al. (2016) using structural estimation techniques. In that paper we show, using an experimental design, that there is a spurious relation between cognitive abilities and estimated risk preferences due to how preferences are elicited. We hypothesize that the spurious relation is due to noisy decision making which we find evidence for in the current paper.
One natural question is whether it suffices to use multiple elicitation tasks to mitigate the bias problem without resorting to structural estimations. In this paper, we show that using a balanced design (in our case pooling two skewed MPLs) mitigates the bias somewhat but does not entirely eliminate it. Naturally, it is inherently hard to construct a fully balanced design since subjects' risk preferences are unknown ex ante. Our results highlight that it is important to employ structural estimation techniques that allow noise to depend on covariates (such as age, education and cognitive ability) in addition to using a balanced design. While this approach requires an extensive set of choice tasks, it enables the researchers to obtain signal-to-noise ratios for a given set of choices.
We also have access to measures of age, gender and personality characteristics (Big Five inventory) of the subjects on whom we elicit risk preferences. We find that age is more weakly related to risk aversion when we do not let noise depend on age. However, when we allow agedependent noise, the negative relationship between risk aversion and age becomes more precisely estimated. Plausibly, a higher amount of trembles among the old disguises the underlying correlation between age and risk aversion. Other variables are less affected by decision noise. In Evidence showing that those with low cognitive ability are more prone to make errors is abundant and, perhaps unsurprisingly, rather clear. For example, Eckel (1999) finds that students with lower cognitive ability (measured by GPA scores) tend to make more inconsistent choices across two measures of risk preferences (abstract vs. context-rich). Similarly, Huck and Weizsäcker (1999) find that subjects with low cognitive ability (measured by math grades) behave more randomly in a lottery-choice experiment. Burks et al. (2009) and Dave et al. (2010) find that subjects with low cognitive ability more often violate monotonicity by switching back and forth when moving down the MPL.
4 particular, coefficient estimates of several personality traits are strikingly similar after allowing for heterogeneous noise.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the basic intuition for why noisy decision making may create biased inference. Section 3 describes the experiments and our measures of cognitive ability and personality. Section 4 presents the results from the main specification, Section 5 discusses the main results and Section 6 concludes.
Experimental variation of bias induced by mistakes
This section explains how errors in decision making and the elicitation procedure interact to create a bias. Depending on the choice task used, noise can bias estimates of risk preferences either way. We illustrate this with reference to the two MPLs used in our study. choosing Left and at some point switches to Right (and then never switches back). 4 The switch point of a risk-neutral decision maker is printed in bold face and relatively "high up" (above the middle row) in the list. Notes: Bold face indicates decision at which a risk-neutral subject would switch from Left to Right. Payoffs are in DKK. 4 We assume monotonic preferences. Strongly risk-loving decision makers choose Right already at Decision 1.
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To illustrate the bias induced by noise in MPL1, assume that there are two types of individuals, A and B, who are heterogeneous in their likelihood to make errors. For the sake of exposition, we assume a simple error structure in which A-types are perfectly error-free, but B-types make a mistake with probability e > 0 (and then pick between Left or Right at random), and choose the lottery that maximizes expected utility with 1 -e. A straightforward way to measure risk preferences is to count how often the decision maker chooses the (relatively safe) Left lottery.
When both types are risk neutral, it is optimal for everyone to switch at decision 3, meaning that A-types make 2 safe choices while B-types make 2 + 3e safe choices in expectation. 5 Hence, Btypes on average appear to be risk averse despite being risk neutral (2 + 3e > 2 for e > 0). Now, suppose for instance that cognitive ability is correlated with being prone to error, i.e., assume Atypes have higher cognitive ability than B-types. Then, any method of statistical inference that does not take the heterogeneity of noise into account finds a spurious negative correlation between cognitive ability and risk aversion, despite the fact that both types have the same true risk preferences.
The right panel in Table 1 shows the second price list MPL2. It produces a positive (or no) correlation between cognitive ability and risk aversion under the simple error structure described above. When all decision makers are risk neutral, error-free A-types switch at Decision 6, implying 5 safe choices. B-types make the same number of safe choices in expectation (but with higher variance). However, if both A-and B-types are moderately risk averse (which is the typical finding in the experimental literature), there is a positive relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion.
The model of errors presented above is referred to as the constant error model, or the tremble model (Harless and Camerer 1994) . Our argument above also holds for a broad range of alternative error structures. For example, similar results obtain if we assume that B-types are consistent in the sense that they do not switch back and forth between the two lotteries, but their choice of switch point is stochastic. The same goes for assuming that B-types switch at a random row with probability e and switch at their preferred row with probability 1-e. In the structural estimation of Section 4 we use the more elaborate random parameter error structure suggested by 5 On the first two rows, the decision maker chooses the Left gamble with probability (1 -e)*1 + e*0.5 = 1 -0.5e. For the remaining 8 rows, the decision maker chooses Left only when he trembles, which gives a probability of choosing the Left gamble of 0.5e. Taken together, this gives 2*(1 -0.5e) + 8*0.5e = 2 + 3e.
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Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) in addition to the tremble parameter. In the Online Appendix, we also estimate a Luce random-utility model that includes a tremble parameter.
Taken together, the discussion above shows that, for plausible levels of risk aversion, smarter people make more risky choices in MPL1 than others, but make less risky choices in MPL2 than others, if people with high cognitive ability are less prone to noisy behavior. We therefore expect a negative relation between risk aversion and cognitive ability in MPL1 and positive relation between risk aversion and cognitive ability in MPL2.
In Section 4 we demonstrate that the bias is reduced by using a balanced design, i.e., by using a design that combines data from MPL1 and MPL2. However, we argue that using a balanced designed might not be sufficient to eliminate the bias, and the balanced design needs to be accompanied by structural estimation techniques aimed at handling heterogeneous noise.
Experimental procedures and measures
This section describes the recruitment procedures, the risk task and other measures of interest such as the cognitive ability test. Table A1 of Online Appendix A shows descriptive statistics for the background variables and measures that we include in our analysis. The description in the following paragraphs tracks the one in Andersson et al. (2016) very closely since we use the same experiment.
Recruitment procedures
We use an online platform called iLEE (internet Laboratory for Experimental Economics)
developed at the University of Copenhagen. Recruitment was carried out by asking Statistics Denmark (the Danish National Bureau of Statistics) to invite a random sample of adults (aged 18-80) residing in Denmark. 6 Invitation letters were sent out using regular mail. The recipients were informed that they were randomly selected to participate in a scientific study in which they could earn money (earnings were transferred via electronic bank transfer). They were provided with a personal identification code and asked to use it to log on to the webpage of the study.
Our data comes from two experiments. In 2008, 2,334 participants participated in the first experiment which included MPL1 and about one year later the same participants were invited to 6 7 participate in a second experiment which included MPL2. A total of 1,396 participants completed the second experiment. The response rate was around 11% percent for MPL1 and around 60% for MPL2, which is similar to other online experiments. 7 In our analysis, we restrict attention to the 1,396 participants that completed both MPL1 and MPL2. The experiments also contained other modules in addition to the ones we use in this paper (e.g., a public good game, a trust game and survey questions). 8
Risk elicitation tasks
The two risk elicitation tasks, MPL1 and MPL2, used different payoffs (see Table 1 ), but were otherwise identical. In both experiments, subjects were informed that they would be asked to make a series of choices between gambles and that one of the gambles would be selected for payment after the experiment. The main difference between the tasks is that the switch point of a risk neutral agent (printed in bold text in Table 1 ), comes further up in MPL1 compared to MPL2.
In line with the discussion in Section 2, a noisy risk-neutral participant will appear more risk averse in MPL1 compared to MPL2. Screenshots and translations of the instructions are available in Online Appendix B.
The results of Dave et al. (2010) show that participants with low level of numeracy have difficulties in understanding MPL formats with varying probabilities. Hence, in order to make the tasks easy to comprehend, which seemed important given the broad sample we targeted, we used fixed 50-50 probabilities and instead varied the prizes (similar to Binswanger 1980 or Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen 2010) . By keeping probabilities fixed, we do not address potential effects from probability weighting (Quiggin 1982; Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012) .
Measures of cognitive ability and personality
To measure cognitive ability, we employ a module of a standard intelligence test called "IST 2000 R". The test items resemble Raven's Progressive Matrices (Raven 1938) , and it provides a measure of fluid intelligence which does not depend much on verbal skills or other kinds of 7 Hoogedorn and Daalmans (2009) show that the overall total sample rate (essentially the share of people who effectively participate as a share of recruited people) is 11.5 percent for the Center Panel at the University of Tilburg which is also an internet-based panel used for online experiments as ours. Von Gaudecker et al. (2012) investigate selection effects in the Center Panel and report that self-selection appears to have a minor impact on estimated risk preferences.
8 knowledge taught during formal education. The test consists of 20 tasks in which a matrix of symbols has to be completed by picking the symbol that fits best from a selection presented to subjects (see Online Appendix B for a screenshot). Subjects had 10 minutes to work on the tasks.
The Cognitive Ability (IST) score used in the analysis below is simply the number of tasks a subject managed to solve correctly.
9
The subjects also completed a Big Five personality test (administered after MPL1 but before the current experiments) which is arguable the most prominent measurement system for personality traits (see Almlund et al. 2011 
Results
The results in Andersson et al. (2016) provide evidence that cognitive ability is related to mistake propensities rather than to risk preferences. In this section, we start by corroborating this finding by using structural estimation techniques. Thereafter, we demonstrate the usefulness of combining a balanced design with econometric methods that allow mistakes propensities to be heterogeneous. Indeed, we find no relation between risk preferences and cognitive ability when we use a more balanced experimental design (by merging the data from MPL1 and MPL2)
together with an econometric specification that allows noise to depend on covariates. Yet, consistent with our argument, we find a strong association between cognitive ability and the noise parameters. Other covariates such as education and age are also related to noise. However, all covariates do not correlate with the noise parameter and are, hence, more stable across specifications. We discuss these findings in more detail in Section 5.
The behavioral noise of the decision process can be taken into account by estimating the risk parameters using a structural model of choice. We estimate such a model under the assumption 9
See figure A1 in Online Appendix A for a graph of the distribution of the IST scores in our sample. 10 The personality and cognitive ability tests are validated instruments developed by Dansk psykologisk forlag, www.dpf.dk. We are grateful for permission to use the tests for our research.
9 that individuals have constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA). That is, the utility function has the following form
where is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The expected utility of a lottery A is simply given by (2) ( ) = � ( ) ( ) .
∈
We define the difference in expected utility between the lotteries Left (L) and Right (R) as
Acknowledging the stochastic nature of the decision making process, we follow Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) who show that random parameter models represent a more robust alternative compared to random utility models as they do not violate the monotonicity assumption.
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Assuming that the risk aversion parameter is randomly affected by noise that follow a logistic distribution, the probability of choosing L is given by where ( , ) is the value at which ∆EU is equal to zero, and is a precision parameter, determining the size of the random noise affecting and ω a tremble probability capturing the probability of making a random choice (see Apesteguia and Ballester 2018 for details about the estimation procedure).
We estimate our baseline results such that risk aversion only depends on cognitive ability. In a second step, we also allow for heterogeneity in the noise and tremble parameters and ω. The results are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. 12 To illustrate the effect of using 10 multiple MPLs, in Table 2 , we report results from structural estimations without a heterogeneous noise and tremble specifications (i.e., the noise and tremble terms only estimated with a constant).
The first two estimations, using only data from MPL1 or MPL2, confirm our previous observations of opposite signs of the correlation between cognitive ability and risk aversion (albeit non-significant in the latter estimation). The final columns show estimations where both
MPLs have been used. The fact that we still find a significant negative relationship, albeit smaller than in MPL1, shows that using multiple MPLs with different implied switch points, is not sufficient to eliminate the bias.
There are two potential ways to handle this further. The first is to use more MPLs with different implied switch points. One obvious caveat with this strategy is that it is hard to ex ante know the risk preferences of subjects, which is needed to cancel out the bias. Notes: The estimations are based on the CRRA utility function. Education1 refers to participants degrees from high school and vocational school, Education2 represents tertiary education up to 4 years and Education3 tertiary education of at least 4 years. Participants with basic schooling (up to 10 years of schooling) are our baseline category. Big5a-Big5o refer to the scores of the Big Five personality dimensions. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Notes: The estimations are based on the CRRA utility function. Education1 refers to participants degrees from high school and vocational school, Education2 represents tertiary education up to 4 years and Education3 tertiary education of at least 4 years. Participants with basic schooling (up to 10 years of schooling) are our baseline category. Big5a-Big5o refer to the scores of the Big Five personality dimensions. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Discussion
The OLS analysis in Andersson (2016) revealed a spurious relationship between risk aversion and many of our control variables such as cognitive ability. The results of the structural model corroborate these results and shed new light on the underlying correlation structure when properly correcting for heterogeneous noise. Table 4 summarizes the coefficients from the estimations in Table 2 and 3 to get a better overview. The leftmost column shows the estimated coefficients for the risk aversion parameter from Table 2 using both MPLs. The two rightmost columns show estimated coefficients for the risk and noise parameters in Table 3 . Older subjects are more risk averse and display more noisy behavior, and the highly educated exhibit less noisy behavior. 13 Similar results have been reported by von Gaudecker et al. (2011) in a study of risk preferences, and by Choi et al. (2014) in a study of optimal consumer choice. These studies also find that the young are more consistent than the old and (as discussed next) that subjects with high education are more consistent than those with less education. 13 We do not find that gender is related to risk preferences in Table 3 . This may come as a surprise given the earlier literature (see for example Croson and Gneezy 2009 for a survey), but it should be noted that in a previous study on the Danish population, Harrison et al. (2007) find no statistically significant gender differences in risk aversion. However, in our study gender seems to be insignificant because our regressions include personality variables which are known to systematically vary with gender (see, e.g., Schmitt et al. 2008 ). If we exclude the Big5 variables, being female is significantly and positively related to risk aversion and to the noise parameter (available upon request). That is, in contrast to cognitive ability, gender appears to be correlated with both risk preferences and noisy decision making. This observation suggests that the often presumed gender difference in risk taking may be far more complicated than previously thought. 
14
A noteworthy pattern in the structural estimates is that age is more weakly related to the risk aversion parameter when we do not let noise depend on age (see Table 3 and the Luce error specification presented in the Online Appendix). But, when we allow for age-heterogeneous noise, we observe a stronger negative relationship between age and the risk aversion parameter.
That is, it appears as if the fact that older subjects behave more nosily, and in particular tremble more, masks an underlying negative relationship between utility curvature and age in our data.
Another remarkable side result of our structural estimations is that the significant relations between the personality variables and risk aversion are almost unaffected by allowing noise to depend on these observed characteristics. This indicates that the risk-aversion estimates robustly relate to the subjects' personalities. This appears intuitive as we have no strong reason to believe that personality traits are strongly connected to noisy decision making. Rather, our results suggest that preferences are linked to the subjects' personalities (as captured by the Big Five variables). Borghans et al. (2008) conclude that personality traits and cognitive ability are interrelated, but that it is possible to econometrically separate them. Almlund et al. (2011) review the literature relating the personality measures to risk preferences, and the findings are mixed. However, some of the earlier studies are consistent with our results. In line with our results, Almlund et al. (2011) report that in the data of Dohmen et al. (2010) agreeableness and openness are related to risk preferences.
Related to the findings presented here, Crosetto and Filippin (2016) argue that decision noise leads to bias in most elicitation tasks. Supporting evidence for this finding is presented by Vieider (2018) who shows that the proposed relationship between violence and a preference for certainty, suggested by Callen et al. (2014) , appears to be spurious and driven by differences in noisy decision making rather preferences. In a similar vein, Bruner (2017) argues that risk aversion causes lower decision errors, which goes counter to the noise argument we propose. Their estimation method builds on a two-step procedure where risk aversion is first estimated and then this measure is correlated against propensities to choose dominated options in a second step.
However, the paper fails to recognize the argument made here, that the risk aversion estimate may be biased by decision errors itself. That is, the risk preference measures from the first step are also prone to bias. Indeed, in their elicitation task it can be shown that, for risk-averse decision makers, higher error propensity leads to an overestimation of risk aversion in the first step, implying that the direction of causality may go in the other direction. 
Conclusion
Establishing relationships between preferences and observable characteristics is inherently difficult since observed choices may be driven by both preferences and bounded rationality. In this paper, we corroborate previous results showing that behavioral noise causes biased inference in risk elicitation tasks. Since such noise is strongly related to many important individual characteristics such as education, age, and cognitive ability, the bias can lead to spurious inference concerning the relationship between measured preferences and these characteristics.
We have argued that two central ingredients in any attempt to remedy the problem are: i) a balanced design that involves multiple choice tasks, and ii) econometric techniques that allow for heterogeneous noise. In particular, structural estimation with heterogeneity taken properly into account is commendable. Our results show that using balanced designs (in our case pooling the two skewed pricelists from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) mitigates the bias but may not entirely eliminate it. Structural models of choice allowing the noise to depend on covariates (such as age, education and cognitive ability), in particular models that allow the researcher to estimate both individual preference parameters and individual error propensities (see von Gaudecker et al. 2011 for an example of such models) seem promising. While this approach requires an extensive set of choice tasks, it enables researchers to obtain signal-to-noise ratios for a given set of choices.
Online Appendix "Robust inference in risk elicitation tasks"
by Ola Andersson, Håkan J. Holm, Jean-Robert Tyran and Erik Wengström
This document provides supplementary information to the paper "Robust inference in risk elicitation tasks using structural estimation techniques". The Appendix is organized into two parts. The first part (A) provides descriptive statistics of the variables we use in our analysis. The second part (B) contains screenshots and translations of the instructions.
A. Descriptive statistics and estimations using random utility models Figure A1 . Distribution of the cognitive ability score (IST)
Notes: The histogram is based on the subjects used in our main analysis. Number of observations = 1,396; Mean cognitive ability score = 8.8; Median cognitive ability score = 9. Cognitive ability score Notes: The sample consists of subjects completing both MPL1 and MPL2. Cognitive ability measured using the IST test. Education1 refers to participants degrees from high school and vocational school, Education2 represents tertiary education up to 4 years and Education3 tertiary education of at least 4 years. Participants with basic schooling (up to 10 years of schooling) are our baseline category. Big5a-Big5o refer to the scores of the Big Five personality dimensions.
Structural estimation using random utility models
This section presents estimates from a random utility model building on the Luce error structure (introduced by Luce 1959 and popularized by Holt and Laury 2002) , adding a tremble parameter that captures the interpretation of errors laid out in Section 2.
In the example in Section 2, we introduced noise as a probability to randomly choose between the options. We here estimate this particular noise model explicitly using maximum likelihood techniques. More precisely, we assume that with probability ω an individual chooses at random between the two lotteries Left (L) and Right (R) and with probability (1-ω). In addition the individual evaluates the utility difference with an error that follows a type I extreme value distribution (Luce 1959) , i.e a random utility model. This gives rise to the following probability of choosing L:
We estimate these two specifications using maximum likelihood, including data from both MPL1 and MPL2 and the results are presented in Table A2 . Again, in the first model in each 22 table, only the risk aversion parameter depends on cognitive ability and other covariates. Again, we observe that is (borderline) significantly related to cognitive ability when we do not let the noise parameter depend on cognitive ability (p = 0.008 in the Luce specification and p = 0.12 in the contextual utility specification). When we allow also the noise parameters to depend on the cognitive ability, we confirm our previous findings. Cognitive ability is significantly related to the noise parameters but not to the risk aversion parameter. In particular, cognitive ability appear to be strongly related the tremble parameter . A one standard deviation increase in cognitive ability decreases the propensity to tremble with 5 to 6 percentage points (amounting to a 15-19 percent decrease for the median subject).
14 Table A2 : Estimates of risk preferences and noisiness, Luce model with trembles
(1) (2) VARIABLES Translation S1: Experiment 1, Risk preference elicitation task, Instructions Instructions -The heads or tails game.
In the two following screens, please choose between two lotteries.
Please state, whether you prefer the lottery to the LEFT or to the RIGHT. Each lottery has two possible outcomes: HEADS or TAILS. The chances of getting either one are equally big, i.e. each lottery has a probability of 50 percent for HEADS and a probability of 50 percent for TAILS. If the outcome is HEADS, you will receive the HEADS outcome of your chosen lottery. If the outcome is TAILS, you will receive the TAILS outcome of your chosen lottery. There is no right or wrong answer. Just choose the lottery you prefer. If you choose the lottery to the left in the example above: you will win 30 kroner if the coin shows HEADS; and you will win 50 kroner if the coin shows TAILS. If you choose the lottery to the right: you will lose 10 kroner if the coin shows HEADS; and you will win 80 kroner if it shows TAILS.
In the following two screens, there will be two tables, where you will be asked to choose between lotteries similar to the ones in the example. In total, you have to make 17 choices.
When you have made all you choices, one of the 17 rows will be randomly selected. All the rows have the same probability of being chosen. In the selected row, the lottery you have chosen will be played out -which means a coin will be flipped to determine the outcome of the lottery. Thereafter, your earnings will be added to your income. However, some of the rows can bring losses. If the selected row induces a loss, that loss will be deducted from your total income in the experiment. You are almost done with the experiment. The last task we ask of you is to solve some logical problems.
At the top of each of the following problems, you will see a picture that is missing a figure. Below the picture you will see five figures, one of which completes the picture. Please determine which one of the five possible answers should be inserted to replace the question mark in the picture.
Example 1
In the top row of the picture in example one, the small white square becomes a big black square. Thus the small white circle in the bottom row will become a big black circle. The correct solution in example 1 is therefore "Answer 2"
Example 2
In example 2, the triangle in the top row was mirrored horizontally (the triangle was turned upside down) and colored black. Thus, the rectangle in the bottom row should also be mirrored horizontally and colored black. The correct solution example in example 2 is therefore "Answer 4"
Each problem has one logical solution. In each problem you have to click on the answer you believe is correct, and then press Confirm Solution for your answer to be registered.
You have exactly 10 minutes to solve as many of the problems as possible, and then part 3 will be automatically finished. Do not expect to solve all the problems. During the 10 minutes, you can skip back and forth between the problems and you have the possibility of changing your answers. You can skip between the problems in two ways. 1) During the 10 minutes you will see an overview line at the bottom of the screen. By pressing the numbers on that line, you can jump to the desired problem. 2) At the ends of the overview line you can press either the forward or back arrows.
You can leave the logical problem anytime you wish, even though the 10 minutes have not passed. Should you wish to do so, just press Finish Problems.
When you are ready to start solving the problems, press Start problems. When the 10 minutes have passed, the problems will end automatically. Note, that if you log out on the way and return later, you will not be able to continue the logical problems, but will be taken to the finish the experiment stage. 
Some statements about you
In this and the following screens, you will find a number of statements. Read each of the statements carefully and mark how well they fit you.
Mark either:
"Disagrees a lot" if the statement is 100 percent incorrect or you disagree a lot.
"Disagrees" if the statement is wrong on the whole or if you disagree.
"Neutral" if the statement is neither very wrong nor right, or if you are in doubt or neutral towards the question.
"Agrees" if the statement is correct on the whole, or if you agree.
"Agrees a lot" if the statement is 100 percent correct, or if you agree a lot.
There are no right or wrong answers, and the completion of the questions does not presume any special knowledge. Answer all the questions and describe yourself as honestly and precisely as possible. 
Disagrees a lot
Choose between Heads and Tails lotteries
In the third part of last year's experiment, you made a series of choices between two lotteries. We now would like you to repeat this task, but with somewhat different outcomes. There follows a repetition of the instructions.
Please state, whether you prefer the lottery to the LEFT or to the RIGHT. Each lottery has two possible outcomes: HEADS or TAILS. The outcome is randomly determined, and each outcome is equally likely. If the outcome is HEADS, you will receive the outcome stated below HEADS. If the outcome is TAILS, you will receive the outcome stated below TAILS.
There is no right or wrong answer. Just choose the lottery that you prefer.
You will be asked to make a total of 20 choices. One of the 20 rows will be randomly selected for payment. All rows have the same probability of being chosen. In the selected row, the lottery you have chosen will be played out and the outcome HEADS or TAILS will determine your earnings. Some of the rows can bring losses, which will be deducted from your total income in the experiment.
Here is an example: 
